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GOVERNMENT INTRUSION INTO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT




Government contact with members of the defense in criminal
proceedings provokes examination in this Article of the relation-
ship between adversary prejudice and the constitutional right to
counsel in criminal cases. The central thesis presented is that the
constitutional guaranty of counsel protects two distinct kinds of
interests held by an accused. Commonly recognized is a defen-
dant's interest in avoiding conviction and minimizing criminal
sanctions. Less acknowledged is the interest in being treated with
dignity and respect. If the right to counsel is viewed solely from
the first perspective, the right only bars conduct that has an actual
or potential adverse effect on the accused's chances of winning a
favorable disposition of the charges against him. This perspective
predominates in Supreme Court opinions.1 However, the Court on
occasion implicitly has recognized in right-to-counsel cases that an
accused is entitled to be treated with dignity and respect, regard-
less of whether such treatment improves his chances for an acquit-
tal.2 This recognition, though, has not been applied consistently,
and consequently the noninstrumental interest of an accused has
not been afforded adequate protection.
This Article argues that the scope of the constitutional right to
counsel and the remedies available for its protection should be re-
sponsive to these distinct interests since constitutional rights and
remedies in general should be based upon the interests they pro-
tect.3 It further sets forth an understanding of the right to counsel
*Professor of Law, Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, State University of New York at
Buffalo. B.A., Columbia College, 1968; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1973.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 38-43.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 48-85.
3. In Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978), the Court stated: "Rights, constitu-
tional and otherwise, do not exist in a vacuum. Their purpose is to protect persons from
injuries to particular interests, and their contours are shaped by the interests they protect."
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and responsive remedies that more appropriately acknowledge a
defendant's claim to be treated with dignity and respect in the
criminal justice process. Moreover, while the Court has clearly ac-
knowledged a defendant's interest in being free from certain adver-
sary prejudice, this interest sometimes has been afforded inade-
quate protection. Alternative methods available to courts to
protect the instrumental interest are discussed and compared
below.
In United States v. Morrison,4 the Supreme Court avoided
resolving the question of whether adversary prejudice to the ac-
cused is an essential element of proof to establish infringement of
the constitutional right to counsel. The Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals' had dismissed an indictment against Morrison because of
the deliberate and open efforts of federal law enforcement agents
to undermine and sever the relationship between the defendant
and her attorney. The government conceded in argument that the
agents had acted improperlys but relied upon the absence of ad-
versary prejudice to maintain there was no constitutional viola-
tion.7 Assuming without expressly deciding that the agents' con-
duct violated the sixth amendment, the Court held that dismissal
was improper since the conduct neither adversely affected defense
counsel's performance nor otherwise disadvantaged the defense.'
Morrison involved unusual facts in that the accused was aware
of the agents' connection with the government, she did not allege a
detrimental effect on the defense from the intrusion, and the gov-
ernment conceded the impropriety of the intrusion. More typically,
the government invokes a legitimate purpose for a surreptitious in-
trusion, and the defense claims adversary prejudice. For example,
the Supreme Court has determined that no constitutional violation
occurred where an undercover police officer participated in confi-
dential meetings between an accused and his lawyer.9 It based its
In United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981), the Court advanced a similar purpo-
sive view of remedies, maintaining that relief "should be tailored to the injury suffered from
constitutional violation."
4. 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
5. United States v. Morrison, 602 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1979).
6. Brief for the United States at 9, 22-23 n.7, United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361
(1981).
7. Morrison, 449 U.S. at 364.
8. Id. at 363-64.
9. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
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decision on the grounds that a legitimate law enforcement purpose
justified the intrusion and that the accused had not demonstrated
prejudice."' In view of the noninstrumental purposes behind the
counsel guaranty, this Article contends that a defendant in a case
similar to Morrison need not prove actual or possible effect on the
outcome of the criminal proceeding in order to establish an in-
fringement of the right to counsel. The absence of adversary
prejudice should, however, influence the selection of a remedy; in-
stead of dismissing the indictment, an action for damages is the
appropriate remedy for such illicit conduct.1
Recognizing important law enforcement objectives, the Court
has refused to ban all surreptitious intrusion by government agents
into confidential attorney-client relationships in criminal cases.' 2
Accepting the Court's recognition of law enforcement necessity,
current decisional law nonetheless affords an accused insufficient
protection against adversary prejudice from surreptitious intru-
sion. 3 This Article proposes measures that afford.increased protec-
tion to defendants while allowing pursuit of important law enforce-
ment objectives.
Section I analyzes Supreme Court rulings on contact by law
enforcement officers or their agents with members of the defense.
Section II elaborates the two kinds of interests protected by the
right to counsel and discusses decisions that support a noninstru-
mental view of that right. Section III sets forth a functional analy-
sis of rights and remedies. Finally, Sections IV and V provide pro-
posals for controlling government contact with the defense camp.
I. LAW ENFORCEMENT CONTACT WITH THE DEFENSE
A. United States v. Morrison
In United States v. Morrison,14 two federal law enforcement
agents approached Hazel Morrison, without her attorney's permis-
sion, to obtain her cooperation in a related investigation. They
knew she was under indictment and represented by counsel. Dis-
paraging her retained counsel, they advised her to replace him with
10. Id. at 558.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 87-129.
12. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 557.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 125-43.
14. 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
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a public defender. They also warned her that she would "suffer a
long jail term unless she became an informant and accepted their
promise to seek a lenient sentence. She declined, notified her attor-
ney of what had transpired, and maintained his representation
with undisturbed confidence. Morrison pled guilty after the district
court denied a motion to dismiss the indictment.15 On appeal, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the
indictment.16
The government conceded before the Supreme Court that the
agents had acted improperly,17 but argued for reversal of the judg-
ment dismissing the indictment on two alternative grounds: (1)
There was no infringement of the right to counsel because the
agents' conduct, although blameworthy, had not adversely affected
the accused's defense; and (2) regardless of whether a sixth amend-
ment violation had occurred, dismissal was not appropriate be-
cause there was no prejudice to the accused in the adversary pro-
cess.18 Passing over the determination of whether the agents'
conduct violated the sixth amendment and assuming that it did,
the Court ruled that since there was no showing of prejudice, dis-
missing the indictment was unwarranted. Justice White, writing
for an undivided Court, stated that "remedies should be tailored to
the injury suffered from the constitutional violation . ," He
observed that Morrison
demonstrated no prejudice of any kind, either transitory or permanent, to the
ability of her counsel to provide adequate representation in these criminal
proceedings. There is no effect of a constitutional dimension which needs to
be purged to make certain that respondent has been effectively represented
and not unfairly convicted.2 0
In Justice White's view, the inapplicability of the remedies most
commonly used in criminal proceedings, suppression of evidence
and reversal, did not warrant utilization of the more drastic rem-
edy of dismissal.21
15. Id. at 363.
16. United States v. Morrison, 602 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1979).
17. The government also acknowledged that the agents were subject to disciplinary ac-
tion. Brief for the United States at 9, 22-23 n.7, United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361
(1981).
18. Morrison, 449 U.S. at 364.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 366.
21. Justice White explained:
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B. Weatherford v. Bursey
In Weatherford v. Bursey,22 a Title 42 section 198323 action for
damages, plaintiff Bursey had been convicted of state criminal
charges based on the testimony of police undercover agent, Wea-
therford. Weatherford and Bursey were arrested together, charged
as co-defendants, and retained separate counsel. Weatherford at-
tended two meetings between Bursey and his lawyer at the law-
yer's request, and the authorities contended that Weatherford at-
tended in order to maintain his cover.24 The district court ruled in
favor of the prosecution, finding that Weatherford had neither ini-
tiated the meetings nor sought information from the defense, and
had not communicated privileged information acquired at the
meetings to his superiors or prosecuting attorneys.2 5 The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, imposing a blanket prohibition
on attendance by police agents at defense meetings..6
The Supreme Court rejected this rule barring all attendance
by undercover agents at confidential defense meetings on the
ground that failure to attend such meetings could compromise
these agents and undermine their effectiveness.27 The Court also
acknowledged the importance of private attorney-client communi-
Our approach has thus been to identify and then neutralize the taint by tailoring
relief appropriate in the circumstances to assure the defendant the effective as-
sistance of counsel and a fair trial. The premise of our prior cases is that the
constitutional infringement identified has had or threatens some adverse effect
upon the effectiveness of counsel's representation or has produced some other
prejudice to the defense. Absent such impact on the criminal proceeding, how-
ever, there is no basis for imposing a remedy in that proceeding, which can go
forward with full recognition of the defendant's right to counsel and to a fair
trial.
Id. at 365. He noted the absence of any claim of prejudice in the instant case not susceptible
to cure by a new trial or suppression of evidence. Id. at 365-66 n.2.
22. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) prohibits any person from depriving any citizen of "any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws," and if such depriva-
tion occurs, makes the offender "liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
24. Brief for the Petitioners at 7, Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
25. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 548.
26. Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1975). The court concluded that
"whenever the prosecution knowingly arranges or permits intrusion into the attorney-client
relationship, the right to counsel is sufficiently endangered" to constitute a sixth amend-
ment violation, id. at 486, "irrespective of any showing of substantial prejudice to [the]
defense." Id. at 487.
27. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 557.
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cations, but found no violation of the right to counsel in this case:
"There being no tainted evidence . . . , no communication of de-
fense strategy to the prosecution, and no purposeful intrusion by
Weatherford, there was no violation of the Sixth Amendment inso-
far as it is applicable to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment."2
The Weatherford decision has not been interpreted uniformly
by lower courts. They have categorically found no violation of the
right to counsel in good faith attendance by undercover agents at
defense meetings unless there was an appreciable possibility of ad-
versary prejudice to the defense. 29 They disagree, however, over
whether Weatherford by implication condemns, absent prejudice,
an intrusion that is not in good faith.30 The subsequent decision in
28. Id. at 558. The holding distilled three factors: The absence of (a) "tainted evi-
dence," (b) "communication of defense strategy to the prosecution," and (c) "purposeful
intrusion." Id. at 558. The first and second factors focus on the lack of benefit to the prose-
cution or prejudice to the defense, while the third stresses that the intrusion was not wrong-
fully motivated. The opinion is unclear as to whether the presence of all three factors is
necessary to avoid a sixth amendment violation. The Court mentioned the absence of
wrongful motive elsewhere in its opinion, stating: "[T]his is not a situation where the State's
purpose was to learn what it could about the defendant's defense plans and the informant
was instructed to intrude on the lawyer-client relationship or where the informant has as-
sumed for himself the task and acted accordingly." Id. at 557. However, it seemed primarily
to emphasize the absence of adversary prejudice to the defense:
Had Weatherford testified at Bursey's trial as to the conversation between Bur-
sey and [his attorney]; had any of the State's evidence orginated in these conver-
sations; had those overheard conversations been used in any other way to the
substantial detriment of Bursey; or an undercover agent, the details of the [at-
torney-client] conversations about trial preparations, Bursey would have a much
stronger case. ..
...As long as the information possessed by Weatherford remained uncom-
municated, he posed no substantial threat to Bursey's Sixth Amendment rights.
Id. at 554, 556.
29. See, e.g., Klein v. Smith, 559 F.2d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 1977), were the court stated:
The essence of the Court's holding [in Weatherford] appears to be that, at least,
where the intrusion by an "agent" of the prosecution is unintentional or justifia-
ble, there must be some communication of valuable information derived from
the intrusion to the prosecutor or his staff in order that there can appear some
realistic possibility of prejudice to the defendant.
30. The Third Circuit has concluded that a wrongfully motivated intrusion into the
attorney-client relationship violates the sixth amendment regardless of whether the defense
is thereby prejudiced. Morrison v. United States, 602 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 449 U.S. 361 (1981); United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 210 (3d Cir. 1978). On
the other hand, the majority of courts that have confronted this issue have determined that
an appreciable possibility of adversary prejudice is a necessary element of a sixth amend-
ment claim in these circumstances. See New Jersey v. Sugar, 84 N.J. 1, 20 n.12, 417 A.2d
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Morrison has not resolved the disagreement 3 1
II. Two PERSPECTIVES ON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The sixth amendment guarantees an accused "the right... to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 2 This Article em-
ploys a purposive analysis of this guaranty in accordance with the
Supreme Court's view that constitutional rights exist "to protect
persons from injuries to particular interests, and [that] their con-
tours are shaped by the interest they protect."'3 Sixth amendment
interests may be seen as instrumental and intrinsic. Instrumental
interests concern the outcome of a criminal proceedings; an ad-
verse effect upon the accused's ability to win a favorable disposi-
tion of his case constitutes the constitutional injury to this inter-
est. In contrast, injury to intrinsic interests may occur without any
diminution in the likelihood of an advantageous result.
The Supreme Court' and commentators3 5 have distinguished
474, 483 n.12 (1980); United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Glover, 596 F.2d 857, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Kilrain, 566 F.2d 979,
982 n.4 (5th Cir. 1978).
31. Prior to its decision in Weatherford, the Court once before, in Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), had addressed without resolving whether adversary prejudice is
a necessary element of a sixth amendment claim based on intrusion into the defense camp.
The government infiltrated an informant, named Partin, into James Hoffa's entourage dur-
ing his prosecution for violations of the Taft-Hartley Act. Partin overheard statements by
Hoffa regarding efforts to bribe members of the jury. That trial ended in a hung jury. Hoffa
was subsequently tried and convicted of bribery on the basis of Partin's testimony concern-
ing Hoffa's statements. The defense contended that Partin's testimony was inadmissible be-
cause it was the tainted "fruit" of an intrusion into defense trial preparations in violation of
the right to counsel. Id. at 304-09.
The Court assumed, without deciding, that Partin's intrusion into the defense camp vio-
lated the right to counsel such that a conviction following the first trial would have been
"presumptively ... defective." Id. at 307. However, it did not follow from this premise that
Partin's testimony was, therefore, inadmissible. Since the incriminating statements were not
made in the presence of counsel and did not involve a legitimate defense, the Court rejected
the argument that Partin's testimony was the fruit of the assumed sixth amendment viola-
tion. In Hoffa, like Morrison, the Court concluded that the remedy sought was
inappropriate.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
33. Carey, 435 U.S. at 254.
34. Some Supreme Court decisions take a decidely instrumental approach to procedural
due process. See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627-28 (1977) (per curiam) (hearing unneces-
sary when plaintiff fails to challenge substantial truth of material facts); Mathews v. El-
dridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (procedural due process important only as means of ensuring an
accurate decision). Other decisions acknowledge noninstrumental purposes of a fair hearing.
See, e.g.,°Carey, 435 U.S. at 262 ("to convey to the individual a feeling . that the govern-
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
between the instrumental and intrinsic interests of litigants when
defining the content of due process as regards civil and administra-
tive adjudications. As an instrumental matter, procedural due pro-
cess guarantees are "valued ... for their anticipated consequences
as means of assuring that the society's agreed upon rules of con-
duct, and its rules for distributing various benefits, are in fact ac-
curately and consistently followed."36 Professor Michelman, in
describing what he termed the "dignity" and "participation" val-
ues underlying the opportunity to litigate civil disputes, has articu-
lated the intrinsic values implicated by litigation:
Dignity values reflect concern for the humiliation or loss of self-respect which
a person might suffer if denied an opportunity to litigate. Participation val-
ues reflect an appreciation of litigation as one of the modes in which persons
exert influence, or have their wills "counted," in societal decisions they care
about 3 7
An individual's dignity and participation interests are served,
whatever the outcome of the decision-making process, if he is left
with the feeling that he has been dealt with respectfully and fairly.
A. The Instrumental Perspective
According to prevailing legal folkways, defense counsel's singu-
lar duty is to employ all legitimate means at his disposal to avoid
conviction of his client and, where that is not possible, to minimize
the sanctions imposed.3 This depiction of counsel's role mirrors
ment has dealt with him fairly"); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("generating the feeling... that justice has
been done").
35. For an instrumental viewpoint, see Rendleman, Toward Due Process in Injunction
Procedure, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 221, 236-38. For an intrinsic perspective, see Michelman, For-
mal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in NOMOS XXVIII: DUE PRocEss
126, 130-31 (J. Pennock & J. Carman ed. 1977); Subrin & Dykstra, Notice and The Right to
Be Heard: The Significance of Old Friends, 9 HARe. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 449, 451-57 (1974);
Tribe, Perspectives on Bakke: Equal Protection, Procedural Fairness, or Structural Jus-
tice?, 92 HARv. L. REv. 864, 870-71 (1979).
36. L. TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTONAL LAW § 10-7 at 502 (1978).
37. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect
One's Rights, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1172.
38. The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility postulates that the "duty of a lawyer,
both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the
bounds of law. . . ." MODEL CODE OF PROFESIONAL REsPONSIBILITy EC 7-1 (1979). For the
duty of defense counsel to seek mitigation of punishment, see AMERICAN BAR Ass'N PROJ. ON
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARD RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION §§ 6.1, 8.1, at 245, 285 (1970).
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the instrumental understanding of the counsel right; the govern-
ment accordingly contended in Morrison that conduct violative of
the counsel guaranty must entail a likelihood of actual adversary
prejudice to the accused.3 9 Supreme Court elaboration of the coun-
sel guaranty is based primarily upon this instrumental perspective.
The Court's initial, important right-to-counsel decision dealt
with the states' obligation under the fourteenth amendment due
process clause to appoint counsel for indigent defendants in order
to assure a reliable adjudication of guilt. Powell v. Alabama" re-
versed the convictions of several uneducated black youths for lack
of an effective appointment of counsel. The Court reasoned that
without a lawyer's aid, an innocent person "faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his inno-
cence.14 1 Professional representation was seen as necessary to as-
sure accurate verdicts. Appointed counsel was also viewed as ad-
vancing the principle of equality in Gideon v. Wainwright.2 There,
the Court declared that "in our adversary system of criminal jus-
tice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer,
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."'
Even if it is known that an unrepresented indigent is in fact guilty,
convicting him when he would have been acquitted had he the
means to retain counsel offends our sense of fairness. Both reliabil-
ity and fairness are instrumental in that they look to effects upon
the outcome of criminal proceedings.
B. The Intrinsic Perspective
Although an adversary's ultimate goal is to obtain favorable
judicial determinations, outcomes are not everything. I contend
that dignity and participation values, as well as instrumental con-
siderations, pervade Supreme Court decisions defining the right to
39. 449 U.S. at 365.
40. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Powell was a fourteenth amendment due process decision. The
Court, per Justice Sutherland, maintained that the due process right to be heard in a crimi-
nal case entails the right to be heard through counsel, since "[e]ven the intelligent and
educated layman... lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense.
. ." Id. at 69. This forceful endorsement of the necessity of counsel was later qualified in
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), which held that appointment of counsel in criminal
cases is not an absolute requirement of due process.
41. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.
42. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
43. Id. at 344.
1351983]
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counsel4-albeit with less explicitness and perhaps less judicial
commitment. Dignity and participation interests surfaced in pre-
Gideon decisions forbidding interference with retention of counsel
and enjoyment of retained counsel's services by the accused. They
have been reiterated in more recent decisions striking down certain
restrictions on retained or appointed counsel's representational ac-
tivities during trial.45 Further, the Court's approval of self-repre-
sentation in criminal cases reflects recognition of a defendant's le-
gitimate interest in direct participation in his trial as a means of
expressing individual dignity and autonomy. Finally, respect for
intrinsic integrity of the accused provides a plausible foundation
for the controversial and little-understood rule announced in Mas-
siah v. United States.46
1. Interference with defense counsel. A consistent instru-
mental theme underlies the analysis in the appointed counsel cases
from Powell v. Alabama to Gideon v. Wainwright: matching a lay-
man against a professional prosecutor in a contest operated under
complex substantive, procedural, and evidentiary rules creates an
unacceptable risk that innocent persons will be convicted. This
mismatch amplifies the unconscionable disparity between the abil-
ity of rich and poor defendants to navigate the criminal justice
process successfully. 47 In contrast, this theme is muted in contem-
poraneously decided cases involving interference with retained
counsel. In such cases, one can perceive the prelude to an intrinsic
44. Professor Griffiths has proposed an alternative "family model" of criminal proce-
dure in which respect for dignity and individuality of criminal defendants would be primary,
rather than an "extrinsic value for which sacrifices of 'efficiency' are made" or "something
stimulated artificially for the promotion of some other end. . . ." Griffiths, Ideology in
Criminal Procedure or a Third "Model" of the Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359, 384
(1970). I believe that recognition of the personhood of the accused need not be linked to
revolutionary conceptions of the criminal justice process, believing instead that current deci-
sional law provides a basis for advancement of this interest.
45. See infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
46. 377 U.S. 201 (1964); see infra notes 70-85 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (mandating counsel in all federal
felony prosecutions), in which the Court, per Justice Black, observed: "[The sixth amend-
ment] embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does
not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with
power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is represented by experienced and
learned counsel." Id. at 462-63. Justice Brennan has depicted a lawyer's instrumental func-
tion more generally, stating that implementation of the counsel guaranty is necessary "to
give substance to other constitutional and procedural protections afforded criminal defen-
dants." Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 377 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 32
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theme, more fully developed in later decisions.
Glasser v. United States,4 decided in 1942, established that a
person who hires a lawyer to represent him in a criminal case pos-
sesses an absolute sixth amendment right to that lawyer's exclusive
services. Thus, by requiring a lawyer retained by one of several co-
defendants to represent a second defendant, the district court in
Glasser was found to have deprived the fee-paying client of the
right to counsel. Whether joint representation impaired the law-
yer's effectiveness was determined to be immaterial.49 In House v.
Mayo,50 the Supreme Court held that a denial of due process oc-
curred when a state defendant was required to plead to a criminal
charge without the advice of his retained counsel whose presence
had been requested. Subsequently, Chandler v. Fretag51 ruled that
requiring a defendant to answer a state habitual offender charge
without affording him an opportunity to retain counsel violated
due process. House and Chandler were decided when the "funda-
mental fairness" standard of Betts v. Brady52 governed the right to
appointed counsel in a state prosecution. Significantly, the Court
did not inquire in House or Chandler as to whether failure to ap-
point counsel in a similar circumstance would have violated funda-
mental fairness under Betts55
48. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
49. The Supreme Court in Glasser employed three separate lines of analysis to hold
that the trial court's insistence upon joint representation denied the fee-paying client assis-
tance of counsel. First, there was evidence in the record showing that an actual conflict
arose at trial between the defendants, which impaired counsel's performance on behalf of
Glasser. Id. at 72-75. Second, regardless of whether an actual conflict arose, the trial judge
erred in seeking joint representation after counsel alerted him to the possibility of a conflict.
Id. at 76. Third, and most pertinent here, a person who retains counsel has an absolute right
to that lawyer's exclusive services, without regard to actual or possible prejudice. The Court
noted: "Glasser wished the benefit of the undivided assistance of counsel of his own choice.
We think that such a desire ... should be respected. Irrespective of any conflict of interest,
the additional burden of representing another party may conceivably impair counsel's effec-
tiveness." Id. at 75.
50. 324 U.S. 42 (1945).
51. 348 U.S. 3 (1954).
52. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). For discussion of Betts' "fundamental fairness" standard, see
infra notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
53. In House, the Court stated: "We need not consider whether the state would have
been required to appoint counsel for petitioner on the facts alleged in the petition. It is
enough that petitioner had his own attorney and was not afforded a reasonable opportunity
to consult with him." 324 U.S. at 46 (citations omitted). In Chandler, the Court rejected the
state's argument that provision of counsel was not required under Betts, since "[r]egardless
of whether petitioner would have been entitled to the appointment of counsel, his right to
138 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32
More recently, the Court has reversed three convictions on
right-to-counsel grounds because of restrictions imposed upon de-
fense counsel's activities during trial. The convictions were over-
turned without a finding of prejudice to the particular accused and
without relying on the need for a broad rule to ensure reliability
and fairness generally. In the first of these cases, Brooks v. Ten-
nessee," the Court struck down a requirement that a criminal de-
fendant wishing to testify be the first defense witness, because that
restriction burdened counsel with having to advise his client
whether to testify too soon, without important information that
comes from presentation of the defense case.5 Justice Rehnquist,
in dissent, took issue with the majority's reliance on the right to
counsel instead of the more general and difficult ground of due
process procedural fairness.56
Subsequent to Brooks, the Court struck down a state statute
authorizing trial judges to dispense with final summations in non-
jury trials as a denial of the assistance of counsel in Herring v.
New York. 7 Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, once again argued that
the majority had transformed a due process issue into a right-to-
counsel case to avoid "the difficulties of being unable to character-
be heard through his own counsel was unqualified." 348 U.S. at 9. One commentator discov-
ered in House and Chandler the principle that an individual possesses a constitutional right
"to defend himself in whatever manner he deems best, using any legitimate means within
his resources." Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright, The Art of Overruling, 1963 Sup. CT. REV. 211,
243-44.
54. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
55. The defendant chose not to testify after the trial judge, pursuant to a Tennessee
statute, denied a motion to delay his testimony until after other defense witnesses had testi-
fied. The Court reasoned that "requiring the accused and his lawyer to make that choice
without an opportunity to evaluate the actual worth of their evidence. . . deprived [the
accused] of the 'guiding hand of counsel' in the timing of this critical element of his de-
fense." 406 U.S. at 612-13. The Court held alternatively that requiring the defendant to
testify first, or not at all, infringed upon his privilege against self-incrimination by imposing
a penalty on his initial silence. Id. at 610-11.
56. Id. at 618 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist elaborated:
I could understand, though I would not agree with, a holding that under these
circumstances the Fourteenth Amendment conferred a right upon the defen-
dant, counseled or not, to decide at what point during the presentation of his
case to take the stand.. . . The crucial fact here is not that counsel wishes to
have a witness take the stand at a particular time, but that the defen-
dant-whether advised by counsel or otherwise-wishes to determine at what
point during the presentation of his case he desires to take the stand.
Id. (emphasis original).
57. 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
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ize appellant's trial as fundamentally.. . unfair. '5 8
Finally, in Geders v. United States51 the trial court had pro-
hibited a defendant from consulting with his attorney during an
overnight recess of the trial as a safeguard against improper coach-
ing of the defendant prior to his cross-examination scheduled to
commence the following morning. Despite the absence of allegation
or specification of adversary prejudice from sequestration, 0 the
Court unanimously held that the denial of attorney consultation
deprived the accused of the assistance of counsel. While noting
that "[s]uch recesses are often times of intensive work, with tacti-
cal decisions to be made and strategies to be reviewed,""1 the
Court also observed:
At the very least, the overnight recess during trial gives the defendant a
chance to discuss with his counsel the significance of the day's events. Our
cases recognize that the role of counsel is important precisely because ordina-
rily a defendant is ill-equipped to understand and deal with the trial process
without a lawyer's guidance.2
The Court thus recognized that a defendant, as an autonomous
human being participating in a complex process of vital concern to
him, has a constitutionally protected interest in obtaining a timely
explanation of trial developments from his lawyer and in discuss-
ing them with him. Whether such exchanges increase the chances
for an acquittal is irrelevant to the accused's interest in informed
participation.
In sum, the assistance of counsel foundation of these rulings
reflects dignity and participation values. To be sure, the restric-
tions might have affected the outcome in the instant and other
cases.6 3 The Court, however, did not invoke an instrumental ra-
tionale. Further, not even the possibility of such a rationale can be
attributed to the Court's recent recognition of the right of self-rep-
resentation in Faretta v. California.6
58. Id. at 871 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
59. 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
60. Id. at 86.
61. Id. at 88.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 864 (1975) (suggesting defense argu-
ments that could have been made had summation been allowed and concluding that
"[t]here is no way to know whether [they] ... might have affected the ultimate judgment
in this case").
64. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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2. The right of self-representation. The Supreme Court in
Faretta v. California held that the sixth amendment affords an ac-
cused the right to conduct personally his defense without the assis-
tance of a lawyer; hence, a state may not force counsel upon a de-
fendant who wishes to proceed pro se. The Court did not deem
this to be an instance of waiver, since it rejected the notion that
the ability to waive counsel implies the right to proceed pro se.
Instead, it concluded that the sixth amendment affirmatively guar-
antees a right of self-representation. 5
The defendant's voluntary and intelligent decision to re-
present himself, according to the six-member.majority, embodied a
constitutionally protected expression of self. The majority opinion
did not seriously dispute that persons appearing pro se are less
likely to win acquittals than those represented by counsel,66 nor
did the majority refute the dissenters' argument that an unjust
conviction wrongs not only the defendant, but also diminishes pub-
lic confidence in the accuracy of guilt determinations. 7 Rather, the
members of the majority and dissent disagreed upon whether a de-
fendant legitimately may pursue objectives in criminal proceedings
other than avoidance of conviction and punishment. The dissent-
ers equated self-representation with employing the criminal justice
process as an "instrument of self-destruction,"68 while the majority
concluded that an individual's interest in self-expression and iden-
tity outweighed society's instrumental interest in an accurate ver-
dict. The majority wrote: "although he may conduct his own de-
fense ultimately to his own [and society's] detriment, his choice
must be honored out of 'that respect for the individual which is the
65. "Our concern is with an independent right of self-representation. We do not sug-
gest that this right arises mechanically from a defendant's power to waive the right to the
assistance of counsel." Id. at 819-20 n.15 (emphasis original).
66. The Court observed:
It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better de-
fend with counsel's guidance than by their own unskilled efforts. But where the
defendant will not voluntarily accept representation by counsel, the potential
advantage of a lawyer's training and experience can be realized, if at all, only
imperfectly.. . . [I]t is not inconceivable that in some rare instances, the defen-
dant might in fact present his case more effectively by conducting his own
defense.
Id. at 834.
67. Id. at 849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 840 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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lifeblood of the law.' ",69 Faretta accordingly acknowledges the
principle that an accused is entitled to pursue intrinsic ends in the
litigation process, even at the expense of his and society's instru-
mental objectives.
3. Intrinsic values and Massiah v. United States. In Mas-
siah v. United States,70 a co-defendant cooperating with law en-
forcement agents elicited incriminating postindictment statements
from the accused. Relying on the right to counsel, the Court pro-
hibited use of the statements at trial because they had been delib-
erately procured from the accused after the initiation of criminal
proceedings and in the absence of his lawyer. The opinion posited
two rationales for its result: (1) that failure to provide counsel dur-
ing interrogation defeats the right to counsel at trial;71 and (2) that
commencing with arraignment, an accused is entitled to a lawyer's
assistance at all "critical stages" of a criminal proceeding.72
Neither theory provides a tenable basis for Massiah.
Despite its invocation by the Court, fifth amendment concern
with compelled self-incrimination cannot be the basis for Massiah,
for no inherently coercive police interrogation took place. Thus,
the counsel right as conceived in Massiah differs significantly from
that expounded in Escobedo v. Illinois,3 where counsel was viewed
as a "protective device to dispel the compelling atmosphere of in-
terrogation. ' 74  Finally, the conduct forbidden by Mas-
siah-"deliberately elicit[ing]" incriminating statements-has not
been limited to affirmative interrogation or its functional
equivalent. 5
69. Id. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1969) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
70. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
71. Reference was made to the view expressed by four concurring justices in Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), that a person under indictment is entitled to the assistance
of counsel at a police interrogation, since "[a]nything less ... might deny a defendant 'ef-
fective representation at the only stage when legal aid and advice would help him.'" 377
U.S. at 204 (quoting from Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. at 326 (Douglas, J., concurring)).
72. The Court reiterated the observation earlier made in Powell v. Alabama that the
time between arraignment and trial is a "critical period" during which an accused is entitled
to a lawyer's services. 377 U.S. at 205.
73. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
74. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465 (1966).
75. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 272 (1980); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291, 300 n.4 (1980). But see United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. at 276 (Powell, J., concur-
ring). See generally Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is "Inter-
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Also implausible is the Court's reasoning in Massiah that de-
liberate elicitation of inculpatory statements without counsel de-
prives the accused of legal assistance at a "critical stage," customa-
rily understood as any pretrial proceeding at which a lawyer's
specialized knowledge and expertise are relevant to protecting a
defendant's substantive and procedural rights.7  There is no pro-
fessional role for counsel in the circumstances of Massiah. Estab-
lished fourth amendment doctrine teaches that individuals bear
the risk that those in whom they confide may betray their confi-
dence to the authorities and that they accept this risk when speak-
ing to others." The plight of an individual, such as Massiah, who
unknowingly speaks to a government informant, results from mis-
placed confidence for which the speaker bears full responsibility.
Such misplaced confidence by itself does not implicate a right to a
lawyer's advice.76
Despite these implausible justifications for Massiah, the rule
announced therein has prevailed for nearly twenty years and in-
deed was reaffirmed recently in United States v. Henry.79 As sug-
gested in Henry, such abiding commitment implies that Massiah
has an acceptable foundation. The Court stated: "By intentionally
creating a situation likely to induce [the accused] to make incrimi-
rogation"? When Does it Matter? 67 GEo. L.J. 1, 41-55 (1978).
76. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (preliminary hearing); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (pretrial confrontation for identification); Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 52 (1961) (arraignment).
77. "[T]he Fourth Amendment ... [does not protect] a wrongdoer's misplaced belief
that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it." Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966). See also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752
(1971) (a wrongdoer assumes the risk that those he confides in may be cooperating with the
police).
78. The Court's recent application of the Massiah rule in United States v. Henry, 447
U.S. 264 (1980), further illustrates the dubiousness of a critical stage justification. Henry
was placed in the Norfolk City Jail to await trial after his federal indictment for bank rob-
bery. Nichols, an FBI paid informant under sentence for forgery, was imprisoned in the
same cellblock as Henry. When Nichols informed an FBI agent of this fact, the agent told
him to be alert to any statements made by Henry. Nichols testified at Henry's trial to in-
criminating statements concerning the bank robbery allegedly made by Henry, who was con-
victed. The Court reversed the conviction on Massiah grounds, but did not specify the pro-
fessional aid that a lawyer might have rendered Henry had he been present with him in the
cellblock. Conceivably, the attorney might have quelled Henry's impulse to speak about the
bank robbery by warning him of the risk that one's cellmates may be government infor-
mants. Such advice, however, hardly would qualify as professional counseling or the exercise
of legal expertise.
79. 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
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nating statements without the assistance of counsel, the Govern-
ment violated [his] Sixth Amendment right to counsel." 0 Justice
Powell, concurring, elaborated upon this idea, explaining the pur-
pose of the Massiah rule to be that of "preventing police interfer-
ence with the relationship between a suspect and his counsel once
formal proceedings have been initiated."'
These declarations implicate two separate interests of the ac-
cused, both of which were infringed in Massiah, although at differ-
ent points in time. The first invasion occurred when the informant
sought incriminating statements from the accused and consisted of
injury to a personal autonomy interest. The interest protected
there is that of being free from certain types of government ex-
ploitation and deception, regardless of whether inculpatory evi-
dence is obtained and used. The other invasion occurred when an
incriminating statement was obtained and then used at trial. This
injury is, of course, instrumental.
Massiah and its progeny ultimately rest upon the Court's real-
ization that persons facing criminal charges are particularly vulner-
able and therefore deserving of special safeguards against exploita-
tion by the government. The Massiah rule in part protects
interests of the accused that are not dependent upon outcome.
These interests are similar to the dignity and participation inter-
ests already discussed.8 2 The intrinsic interests protected by Mas-
siah, however, are antecedent and distinct from the defendant's
participation in or understanding of the criminal trial.
There is admittedly certain language in the Massiah opinion
80. Id. at 274.
81. Id. at 276 (Powell, J., concurring).
82. This is not to say, however, that judicial recognition of the intrinsic interests pro-
tected by Massiah has no utilitarian benefit for the administration of criminal justice. For
example, in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), a lawyer arranged for his client's sur-
render on a felony warrant in reliance upon assurance by the authorities that the client
would not be questioned until he had an opportunity to consult with his lawyer. Despite
being aware of this representation, a police detective extracted incriminating statements
from Williams by means of the now infamous "Christian burial speech." The Court reversed
the conviction on Massiah grounds in a 5-4 decision. Justice Stevens, concurring in the
judgment, stressed the importance of lawyers being able to rely upon commitments from law
enforcement authorities in advising their clients, since lawyers are "the essential medium
through which the demands and commitments of the sovereign are communicated to the
citizen. If, in the long run, we are seriously concerned about the individual's effective repre-
sentation by counsel, the State cannot be permitted to dishonor its promise to this lawyer."
Id. at 415 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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which is seemingly inconsistent with this understanding. First, the
Court does not disapprove continued investigation of an accused's
suspected criminal activities under the sixth amendment. Second,
the Court expresses exclusion of incriminating evidence as the
holding of Massiah. The first point can be dealt with briefly. The
Court approved the employment of some, but not all, investigatory
tactics against a person under indictment. 3 For example, his con-
versations may be the target of electronic eavesdropping under the
fourth amendment, for a defendant's fourth amendment privacy
interest is no greater than that of citizens generally. However, a
noninstrumental sixth amendment interest is infringed when the
government seeks to inveigle the guilty words from the accused.
Therefore, this investigatory tactic is forbidden. The Court's em-
phasis on exclusion in Massiah85 generates a larger, often over-
looked issue; the important distinction between rights and reme-
dies. This distinction, central to this Article, is elaborated in
Section III.
III. A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
Constitutional litigation normally involves two types of claims:
(1) that the Constitution protects certain interests which govern-
ment has a duty to foster or at least not hinder; and (2) that a
litigant is entitled to specified relief because of forbidden govern-
ment conduct. The former are termed "rights" and the latter
"remedies" in conventional legal usage.
The Supreme Court teaches that rights are functionally de-
83. The United States Solicitor General contended before the Supreme Court that the
government's conduct in Massiah was warranted because of suspicion that the accused was
part of a larger criminal conspiracy, to which the Court replied:
We may accept and, at least for present purposes, completely approve all that
this argument implies, Fourth Amendment problems to one side. We do not
question that in this case, as in many cases, it was entirely proper to continue an
investigation of the suspected criminal activities of the defendant and his alleged
confederates, even though the defendant had already been indicted.
377 U.S. at 206-07.
84. The Court in United States v. Henry distinguished between listening and active
stimulation of incriminating comments; Massiah forbids only the latter. 447 U.S. at 271 n.9.
See also id. at 276 (Powell, J., concurring) (sixth amendment is only violated when incrimi-
nating statements are induced; the use of a passive listening device is not forbidden).
85. The Court wrote: "[W]e hold . . . that the defendant's own incriminating state-
ments, obtained by federal agents under the circumstances here disclosed, could not consti-
tutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his trial." 377 U.S. at 207.
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fined in terms of the interests they are designed to protect. Two
kinds of interests protected by the right to counsel have been iden-
tified: (1) an intrinsic interest of persons charged with crime in be-
ing treated with dignity and respect;86 and (2) an instrumental in-
terest in accurate and fair determination of guilt.87 These
categories are not mutually exclusive, but they are distinct.
Prosecutorial conduct may invade an intrinsic interest without
prejudicing the verdict or vice versa. Further, such conduct may
infringe upon both types of interests, but at different points in
time, as in Massiah8s
As the Supreme Court has stated, remedies "should be tai-
lored to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation."8
More precisely, remedies should be responsive to the particular in-
terest or interests infringed, since rights, such as the right to coun-
sel, often consist of several divisible interests. The most common
remedies available in criminal proceedings-exclusion of evidence
and reversal of conviction-are well suited to prevent or rectify in-
strumental harm. These remedies, however, do not function as well
in redressing injury to intrinsic interests.
A comparison of the fourth and fifth amendment rules of evi-
dentiary exclusion is illustrative. The fifth amendment rule pro-
scribing evidentiary use of a coerced confession effectuates a defen-
dant's instrumental interest in not being convicted on the basis of
his own compelled testimony.90 To be sure, human dignity values
are among the underpinnings of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation.91 However, the fifth amendment privilege is instrumental
in that it addresses the impact of certain conduct in criminal pro-
ceedings rather than the primary conduct itself. In contrast, the
fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures expressly provides a limitation on primary conduct. A de-
86. See supra text accompanying notes 48-85.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 38-43.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 79-82.
89. Morrison, 449 U.S. at 364.
90. Compulsion of testimony by itself does not violate the fifth amendment privilege,
since the testimony compelled must also be incriminating. Accordingly, testimony may be
compelled under threat of contempt if a witness is guaranteed that the testimony will not be
used against him in a future criminal prosecution. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
441 (1972).
91. See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (the privilege em-
bodies "respect for the inviolability of of the human personality"). See generally L. LEvY,
ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 329-32 (1968).
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fendant is empowered to exclude evidence derived from a fourth
amendment violation.2 It is now recognized, however, that the
purpose of such exclusion is to deter violations of the fourth
amendment rather than redress a constitutional injury to the de-
fendant.9 3 Redress for such injury is the function of a civil action
for damages.9 4
The Massiah doctrine combines attributes of both the fourth
and fifth amendment prohibitions. Like the fourth, it protects in-
terests unrelated to events at trial; like the fifth, it protects against
certain adverse consequences in the trial process.95 Accordingly,
the victim of a Massiah violation should be able to sue for dam-
ages to redress injury to his nontrial related interest. No appropri-
ate remedy is available in the criminal justice process, however, to
vindicate these interests. 6
Although adversary prejudice is not relevant to infringement
of intrinsic interests protected by the sixth amendment, that factor
has preoccupied the Court. This preoccupation exists in part be-
cause the remedies most often sought in counsel cases are convic-
tion-nullifying, such as dismissal in Morrison and reversal in Wea-
therford. These remedies impose high social costs: delay, retrials,
and nonconvicted defendants. These costs have been accepted as
justified where a violation impugns the reliability of the guilt-de-
termining process, but where reliability is not compromised, the
Court has developed rules to mitigate the costs of conviction-nulli-
fying remedies, such as the harmless error and retroactivity doc-
trines.9 7 If a constitutional error could not have affected the out-
come of the trial, it is deemed harmless and reversal is not
92. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914).
93. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976).
94. Indeed, the victim of an unreasonable search and seizure is entitled to bring an
action for damages under the fourth amendment. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 79-82.
96. Cf. United States v. Glover, 596 F.2d 857, 864 n.10 (9th Cir. 1979).
97. A prejudice requirement has also been used to limit federal habeas corpus review of
certain claims barred from direct review. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Davis
v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973). The "cause and prejudice" standard announced in
these cases is a jurisdictional prerequisite for federal habeas corpus relief in the circum-
stance of a procedural default rather than an element of the constitutional claim. See gener-




required.9 If a newly announced constitutional rule does not affect
the reliability of the criminal justice process, it will not be applied
retroactively to overturn final convictions.99
These remedial limitations, while focusing on adversary
prejudice and reliability, do not alter the substantive content of
the underlying constitutional rights. The Court on occasion,
though, has incorporated adversary prejudice as an essential ele-
ment of proof. Hence, although the right to a speedy trial protects
nonoutcome related interests of the accused,'00 relief for undue de-
lay typically requires a showing of prejudice.' 0 ' The Court un-
doubtedly imposed this requirement because it assumed that the
only remedy was dismissal of the indictment and subsequent im-
munity from prosecution. 0 2 As Professor Amsterdam has argued,
this assumption is questionable, and the preferable response would
be to formulate alternative, less costly remedies.
03
Accordingly, it is important, especially in criminal cases, to
differentiate between a demonstration of prejudice required to es-
tablish infringement of a right from that required to establish enti-
tlement to a particular remedy. Nonobservance of this distinction
restricts the use of conviction-nullifying remedies. It also distorts,
however, the appropriate contours of constitutional rights and pre-
vents recognition of constitutionally relevant interests of an ac-
cused where they are not instrumentally related to guilt. Careful
recognition of the distinction between rights and remedies, to-
gether with the formulation of relief tailored to the particular in-
terest at issue, is plainly a better method for limiting conviction-
nullifying remedies.
Adversary prejudice is the principal occasion for conviction-
nullifying remedies. As the Court has recognized, however, an ex-
ceptional need for deterrence of unconstitutional conduct may
98. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
99. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
100. The speedy trial clause of the sixth amendment protects the accused against "un-
duly prolonged pretrial detention," "overlong subjection to the vexations and vicissitudes of
a pending criminal accusation," and impairment of the defense at trial from such things as
lost evidence and faded memory. Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies,
27 STAN. L. REV. 5P5, 532-33 (1975). See also, Godbold, Speedy Trial-Major Surgery for a
National Ill, 24 ALA. L. REv. 265, 268-72 (1972).
101. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
102. See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973).
103. Amsterdam, supra note 100, at 532-39.
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warrant such relief, notwithstanding the absence of prejudice. The
Morrison Court observed that dismissal might have been appropri-
ate if the law enforcement conduct there had been part of "a pat-
tern of recurring violations by investigative officers . . ".., Such
relief, of course, would not be for the purpose of redressing injury
to the accused.
Whether a defendant may invoke conviction-nullifying relief
to deter unconstitutional conduct that did not affect the outcome
of his case depends upon such factors as the importance of the
interest or principle at stake, the adequacy of alternative remedies,
and the social cost of implementing the particular relief at issue.
Weighing these factors, the Court has refused to treat racial dis-
crimination in selecting a grand jury as harmless error, even where
the defendant was convicted by a properly constituted petit jury
after an error free trial.105
IV. OPEN INTRUSION INTO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
AND INTRINSIC INTERESTS OF THE ACCUSED
A. The Injury to Intrinsic Interests in Morrison
Conditioning the right to counsel on adversary prejudice ig-
nores an accused's interest in expressing his dignity and autonomy
through participation in the criminal justice process and also his
interest in being accorded respect prior to trial. The agents' con-
duct in Morrison is comparable to an unsuccessful attempt to elicit
incriminating statements in violation of Massiah. The failure of
both ventures, and hence no finding of prejudice, does not alter the
initial injury to dignity and respect. Assuming no prejudice in
Morrison, the prosecutorial conduct nonetheless probably caused
embarrassment and insecurity, and consequently injury to a consti-
tutionally protected dignity interest.
The Court did not deny that Hazel Morrison experienced dis-
tress, nor did it seek to justify such injury as a necessary incident
of a criminal prosecution. Rather, it focused on the irrelevance of
104. 449 U.S. at 66 n.2.
105. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979). The Court noted the country's deep and
long-standing commitment to combatting racial discrimination in the administration of
criminal justice, the demonstrated ineffectiveness of civil suits and criminal prosecutions in
attaining this goal, and the fact that the remedy of reversal would not prevent subsequent
reindictment and retrial or render that task more difficult by denying the prosecution use of
relevant evidence. Id. at 554-58.
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dismissal of the prosecution to her injury. Concern with the costs
of that remedy, though, does not warrant disregard of constitu-
tional injury. Instead, alternative remedies should be employed to
vindicate the intrinsic interests of the accused.108
When government officials make a deliberate and bad faith at-
tempt to interfere with the relationship between an accused and
his attorney, damages are an appropriate remedy. Awarding dam-
ages would accomplish not only the primary objective of personal
redress; it also would punish the persons responsible, deter similar
misconduct in the future, and affirm the sanctity of the attorney-
client relationship.
B. The Measurement of Damages
The yardstick for measuring damages1'07 in an instance of non-
monetary injury is critical to the efficacy of the suggested rem-
edy.108 The threshold question is the applicability of Carey v.
Piphus,109 the 1978 Supreme Court decision barring presumed
damages for a violation of procedural due process and setting forth
106. In Morrison, the Court was careful not to preclude alternative remedies to dismis-
sal, stating: "[We] do not condone the egregious behavior of the Government agents. Nor do
we suggest that in cases such as this, a Sixth Amendment violation may not be remedied in
other proceedings." 449 U.S. at 367.
107. The common law of torts recognizes three types of damages: nominal, punitive and
compensatory. Nominal damages are a trivial sum of money awarded to establish a legally
protected interest on the part of a plaintiff where a defendant's violation of that interest did
not cause actual injury. Their purpose is declaratory and vindicatory rather than compensa-
tory. Punitive damages are levied against a defendant for particularly outrageous miscon-
duct in order to punish and deter him and others from similar activity. Compensatory dam-
ages are awarded to a plaintiff in order to make up for some actual injury suffered as a
consequence of a defendant's wrongful act. See D. DoBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REME-
DIES, §§ 3.1, 3.8, 3.9 (1973).
Compensatory damages may be special or general. Special damages are awarded to com-
pensate for items of pecuniary loss that are more or less peculiar to a particular plaintiff.
General damages, which may be either pecuniary or nonpecuniary, are awarded to compen-
sate for harm normally expected to flow from particular tortious conduct. In either case, a
plaintiff ordinarily has the burden of proving the amount of compensable loss recoverable as
special or general damages. Id. at § 3.2. However, the common law made an exception where
the cause of action is based upon harm to certain "dignitary" interests, such as voting
rights, reputation and privacy, allowing damages to be presumed in such cases without proof
of actual harm. Id. at § 7.3.
108. For an overview of the elements of and defenses to constitutional tort actions, see
generally Love, Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67 CALIF. L.
REV. 1242, 1249-58 (1979).
109. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
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the framework for damage awards for complaints of constitutional
injury in Title 28, section 1983110 and Bivens-type actions."1 The
plaintiffs in Carey complained of suspension from high school in
violation of procedural due process; the issue was whether they
could recover substantial nonpunitive damages absent proof of in-
dividualized injury. The Court insisted on proof of actual injury for
compensatory damages; 1 2 without such proof, only nominal dam-
ages are permissible,"' except perhaps where malicious conduct
renders punitive damages appropriate."'
In stating that "'[t]he cardinal principle of damages in Anglo-
American law is that of compensation... , ,,115 the Court rejected
the idea of nonpunitive damages as vindication of the constitu-
tional right independent of consequential harm to an individual or
deterrence. Vindication, the Court held, is satisfied by nominal
damages;' deterrence, beyond the secondary by-product of com-
pensatory awards, is the function of punitive damages.117
The Court further observed that the common law of torts pro-
vides a "starting point" for reckoning damages, while keeping in
mind that this body of doctrine may not provide a complete solu-
tion.118 If the constitutional violation parallels closely a common
law tort, the common law rule may be borrowed; if a common law
analogue is lacking, the process is one of adaptation. 1 9 The Court's
analysis of the procedural due process claim illustrates the meth-
odology. The plaintiffs invoked the common law doctrine of pre-
sumed damages by analogizing violations of procedural due process
with defamation per se. 20 According to the Court, damages may be
presumed in the case of dignitary torts, such as defamation per se,
110. See supra note 23.
111. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388 (petitioner entitled to damages for injuries resulting from
federal agent's violation of fourth amendment rights). See generally Love, supra note 108;
Note, Damage Awards For Constitutional Torts: A Reconsideration After Carey v. Piphus,
93 HARV. L. REV. 966 (1980); Comment, Presumed Damages for Fourth Amendment Viola-
tions, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 192 (1980).
112. Carey, 435 U.S. at 262-64.
113. Id. at 266.
114. Id. at 257 n.11.
115. Id. at 254-55 (quoting 2 HARPER & JAMES, LAW OF TORTS, § 25.1 (1956)).
116. Id. at 266.
117. Id. at 257 n.1 1& 266.
118. Id. at 257.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 261.
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where injury is both likely and primarily intangible, and where loss
is exceptionally difficult to prove.12' The Court rejected the anal-
ogy between defamation and procedural due process,"' while ex-
pressly leaving open the possibility of presumed damages for viola-
tions of other constitutional rights. "'23
In light of the intangible, dignity interest within the purview
of the right to counsel, there is a sound basis for presuming dam-
ages in Morrison. First, the intentional invasion of the accused's
intrinsic interest in Morrison closely parallels the common law tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress for which presumed
damages are recoverable. 2 " Further, the reasons for the Court's re-
fusal to presume damages in Carey 25 are inapplicable for the most
part in Morrison. Unlike the procedural deprivation in Carey, the
disparagement of counsel and threats against the accused in Morri-
son were virtually certain to cause an ordinary person distress and
humiliation. Additionally, causal ambiguity is far less troublesome
in Morrison than in Carey. The trauma connected with Hazel
Morrison's presumably valid conviction is comparable to the dis-
tress accompanying a substantively justified but procedurally de-
fective school suspension. In both instances, the substantive depri-
vation is noncompensable. However, emotional distress flowing
from the unconstitutional assault on the accused's dignity in Mor-
rison was separate in time and place from the criminal justice pro-
cess leading to conviction. This distinction thereby alleviated the
causal ambiguity that concerned the Court in Carey, and thus per-
mitted the separation of compensable from noncompensable in-
121. Id. at 262.
122. The opinion presented three reasons for rejecting the analogy. First, a procedural
deprivation in and of itself is less likely to cause emotional injury than statements that are
defamatory per se. Such statements will almost always arouse strong feelings, while a person
denied due process "may not even know that procedures were deficient until he enlists the
aid of counsel to challenge a perceived substantive deprivation." Id. at 263. Secondly, defa-
mation per se is virtually certain to cause reputational injury, more difficult to prove than
either the emotional distress or tangible harm from a procedural deprivation. Id. Finally,
procedural due process claims may involve "an ambiguity in causation" that is absent from
defamation cases. Id. This ambiguity stems from the fact that if the substantive deprivation
is justified despite a denial of due process, only that portion of the emotional distress inci-
dent to the procedural deprivation is compensable. Id. at 263-64.
123. "[Tlhe elements and prerequisites for recovery of damages appropriate to compen-
sate injuries caused by the deprivation of one constitutional right are not necessarily appro-
priate to compensate injuries caused by the deprivation of another." Id. at 264-65.
124. See D. DOBBS, supra note 107, at § 7.3 (1973).
125. See supra note 122.
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jury. Hazel Morrison thus should be able to recover presumed
damages.
This analysis accepts Carey's premise that presumed damages
are justified because of difficulty inherent in calculating actual
damages suffered by the victim of the dignitary tort. However, a
strong argument can be made that deterrent and public values also
justify presumed damages in a situation like Morrison. As Profes-
sor Dobbs has observed, presuming damages for dignitary torts
"often operates to enforce limits upon the official or unofficial
power of persons in authority and to preserve rights of the public
generally to be free from oppressive conduct."' 2 Similarly, another
commentator has maintained that a "superliability rule" is needed
to achieve deterrence by awarding damages in excess of typical
compensatory recoveries for actual injury and typical exemplary
damages for malicious intent.127 Such a rule would protect the
"merit-good" quality of the human dignity interests at stake.12
Finally, a person able to demonstrate that conviction was the
result of a deliberate bad faith violation of the right to counsel
should recover compensatory damages for pecuniary and nonpecu-
niary loss stemming from the conviction itself, in addition to pre-
sumed damages for noninstrumental harm. Reversal on appeal is
not sufficient, since it does not undo the financial and emotional
harm of an invalid conviction. Only damages can compensate for
such injuries. 29
126. D. DOBBS, supra note 107, at § 7.3, 531.
127. Yudof, Liability for Constitutional Torts and the Risk-Averse Public School Offi-
cial, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 1322, 1379 (1976). See also Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089,
1092-93 (1972).
128. Yudof, supra note 127, at 1379.
129. See Berlin Dem. Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.C.D.C. 1976), where the
court detailed the inadequacy of reversal to remedy completely the harm from a conviction
obtained in violation of a defendant's sixth amendment rights:
The right to reversal on appeal ... is far more limited an interest than the right
to a fair trial, which the sixth amendment protects. A criminal . . .convicted,
... regardless of appellate reversal, has suffered obvious harm through loss of
his reputation, his financial resources, and perhaps his freedom pending appeal.
Reversal on appeal may ameliorate the extent of these damages; it cannot eradi-
cate them. If a coriviction has been caused at least in part by violation of the
criminal's sixth amendment rights, there is no adequate remedy other than dam-




V. SURREPTITIOUS INTRUSION INTO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP AND INSTRUMENTAL INTERESTS OF THE ACCUSED
If one accepts the premise that undercover agents are an in-
dispensable part of modern law enforcement and that the govern-
ment has a legitimate interest in veiling their indentity for as long
as possible, then covert attendance at defendant-lawyer meetings,
if necessary to maintain the agents' cover, does not constitute a
violation of the right to counsel. 130 However, the possibility, if not
the likelihood, of adversary prejudice to an accused consequent to
such intrusion presents a separate problem. Even where an accused
suffers adversary prejudice, this injury arguably is not compensa-
ble in damages. For, as discussed below, adversary prejudice is fre-
quently unavoidable and may occur without any intentionally
wrongful conduct on the part of the agent.' 3' In these circum-
stances a damage award against the agent would not be feasible or
warranted. Accordingly, other measures designed to prevent and
neutralize adversary prejudice from such conduct are called for.
A. Inadequate Protection from Adversary Prejudice in
Weatherford
Covert intrusion into the defense camp poses a serious threat
to balance and fairness in criminal proceedings; both would be illu-
sory if the prosecution were permitted to obtain convictions
through spying on the accused and his attorney. 32 Although the
Court in Weatherford acknowledged that a conviction actually ob-
tained through such methods cannot stand, it imposed formidable
and excessive obstacles of proof to establish adversary prejudice. A
showing that a police undercover agent acquired information re-
lated to the pending prosecution would not be enough. A defen-
dant must demonstrate that evidence or defense strategy has been
communicated to the prosecutor.' 33 The Court refused to accept
130. The Court's analysis in Weatherford rests on these premises. 429 U.S. at 557.
131. See infra notes 132-50 and accompanying text.
132. See O'Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345 (1967) (per curiam) and Black v.
United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966) (per curiam) in which the Court ordered new trials upon
discovering that federal agents, using electronic devices, had intercepted attorney-client
communications during trial preparations.
133. "[H]ad the prosecution learned ... the details of the Bursey-Wise conversations
about trial preparations, Bursey would have a much stronger case." Weatherford, 429 U.S.
at 554. "As long as the information possessed by Weatherford remained uncommunicated,
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that such communication would occur as a matter of course, en-
dorsing instead the district court's finding that nothing learned by
the undercover agent in Weatherford was relayed to the prosecut-
ing attorney or his staff.134
he posed no substantial threat to Bursey's Sixth Amendment rights." Id. at 556.
134. Id. Since the district court found that the prosection had acquired neither evi-
dence nor information concerning defense strategy as a result of the intrusion, the Court did
not expressly decide whether such communication creates an irrebuttable presumption of
prejudice. Two lower courts, however, have addressed this issue.
In United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1978), government lawyers learned
through an informant that the defense planned to concentrate on attacking the credibility
of two prosecution witnesses. The district court denied a motion to dismiss the indictment,
finding that the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense would
not be prejudiced at trial by this premature disclosure of defense strategy. The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, ruling that the indictment should have been dis-
missed. It reasoned that the prosecution's advance knowledge of defense strategy creates
opportunities for prejudice too diverse and subtle for a court to predict prejudice pretrial or
to detect its occurrence posttrial. Id. at 208. Further, even if such determinations could be
made with accuracy, it maintained that the very fact of the inquiry would tend to chill free
and open communication between defense attorneys and their clients, Accordingly, it con-
cluded that:
The inquiry into prejudice must stop at the point where attorney-client confi-
dences are actually disclosed to the government enforcement agencies responsi-
ble for investigating and prosecuting the case. Any other rule would disturb the
balance implicit in the adversary system and thus would jeopardize the very pro-
cess by which guilt and innocence are determined in our society.
Id. at 209.
In New Jersey v. Sugar, 84 N.J. 1, 417 A.2d 474 (1980), the New Jersey Supreme Court
observed that disclosure of defense strategy to the prosecution "puts the defense at an im-
measurable disadvantage" for which dismissal is the only effective remedy. Id. at 19, 417
A.2d at 483. However, where the state acquires tainted evidence as a result of an unlawful
intrusion into confidential attorney-client communications, the court would permit the pros-
ecution to proceed provided the state first establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that it can
prove a prima facie case using untainted evidence and witnesses. Id. at 25, 417 A.2d at 484.
Although Weatherford did not directly address the rebuttal issue, one passage in the
Court's opinion seems pertinent:
As long as the information possessed by Weatherford remained uncommuni-
cated, he posed no substantial threat to Bursey's Sixth Amendment rights. Nor
do we believe that federal or state prosecutors will be so prone to lie or the
difficulties of proof will be so great that we must always assume not only that an
informant communicates what he learns from an encounter with the defendant
and his counsel but also that what he communicates has the potential for detri-
ment to the defendant or benefit to the prosecutor's case.
429 U.S. at 556-57 (emphasis added). One could argue, based upon the italicized language,
that the Court left open the possibility of rebutting prejudice where evidence or defense
strategy is disclosed to the prosecutor. However, the language is more reasonably read as
permitting such rebuttal, if at all, only where the information communicated to the prosecu-
tor in no way relates to the pending prosecution, as where the conversation reported to the
prosecutor concerned the weather. On the other hand, if the information relayed, whether it
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This communication demand is questionable for several rea-
sons noted in Justice Marshall's dissent.135 First, communication of
defense strategy to the prosecution may not be the essence of the
harm where, as in Weatherford, the key prosecution witness at
trial was privy to confidential attorney-client discussions. Such
witnesses are "in a position to formulate in advance answers to an-
ticipated questions, and even to shade their testimony to meet ex-
pected defenses." '136 Second, an undercover agent's silence implic-
itly informs the prosecutor that the defense has no surprises
planned for trial.1 37 Third, proving communication of defense
strategy frequently poses an insurmountable barrier "because such
proof requires an informer or prosecutor to admit his own wrong-
doing (and open the door to damage suits and attacks on convic-
tions)." 138 In addition, whatever factual support underlies the
Court's assumption of no communication where the relationship
between law enforcement and prosecution staffs is that of witness
and attorney, none exists where the law enforcement agents help
prepare the case and assist government counsel at trial. In these
circumstances, to assume that privileged information possessed by
law enforcement officials has not been incorporated into the prose-
cution's case, whether with or without the prosecuting attorney's
knowledge, would be contrary to experience. 13 9
Prejudice to the defense from surreptitious intrusion by police
agents goes beyond acquisition of evidence or premature disclosure
of defense strategy, for harm in a particular case may consist of
impairment or indeed destruction of the attorney-client relation-
ship. The seeds of distrust and their consequences are strikingly
illustrated in a recent California case 4 0 in which multiple defen-
dants, including an undercover police officer, faced misdemeanor
charges resulting from a nonviolent protest at a nuclear power fa-
cility. For nearly two months after arraignment the undercover of-
ficer attended attorney-client meetings and actively participated in
planning defense strategy. This, the state argued, was necessary to
relates to evidence or strategy, "has the potential for detriment to the defendant or benefit
to the prosecutor," id., the presumption of prejudice should be irrebuttable.
135. Id. at 561 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 564.
137. Id. at 565.
138. Id.
139. See United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 207 (3d Cir. 1978).
140. Barber v. Municipal Court, 24 Cal. 3d 742, 598 P.2d 818, 157 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1979).
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obtain information about possible terrorist infiltration of an-
tinuclear power groups. The California Supreme Court ruled that
the officer's conduct had violated state law and ordered dismissal
of the charges. 14 1 It concluded that dismissal was necessary since
the paranoia and mistrust engendered among the defendants upon
learning of the intrusion rendered effective representation
impossible. 142
Additional cases illustrate direct assaults upon the attorney-
client relationship when, for example, law enforcement agents dis-
parage a defendant's attorney. Although federal decisions recog-
nize that derogatory remarks to a defendant about the competence
of his counsel may warrant dismissal or reversal under the sixth
amendment, no federal defendant yet has been able to demon-
strate the resulting impairment of counsel's performance necessary
to warrant these remedies.1 43 State defendants, on the other hand,
have fared somewhat better with disparagement claims.144
Surreptitious intrusion not only threatens the integrity of a
particular criminal proceeding, but also undermines the effective-
ness of counsel generally. Fear of police intrusion on confidential
attorney-client communications tends to inhibit a candid and full
exchange of information and ideas between attorneys and defen-
dants. This is obviously necessary for meaningful implementation
of the right-to-counsel guaranty. 45 Mindful of the importance con-
fidence and candor play in the attorney-client relationship, the Su-
preme Court has forbidden on constitutional grounds surreptitious
electronic interception of conversations between defendants and
their attorneys during trial preparations. 46 Consequently, the
Court in Weatherford distinguished between the presence of un-
dercover agents at confidential defense meetings and electronic
eavesdropping by asserting that the chilling effect from the poten-
141. Id. at 760, 598 P.2d at 834, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
142. Id. at 756, 598 P.2d at 833, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
143. See Morrison, 449 U.S. 361; United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182, 1188-89 (9th
Cir. 1980).
144. See Commonwealth v. Manning, 373 Mass. 438, 367 N.E.2d 635 (1977); People v.
Moore, 57 Cal. App. 3d 437, 129 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1976).
145. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403-04 (1976) (establishing that the
common law attorney-client privilege has constitutional dimension because of the necessity
for full disclosure by the client "to obtain fully informed legal advice").
146. See O'Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345 (1967) (per curiam); Black v. United
States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966) (per curiam).
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tial presence of undercover agents is less than that accompanying
the threat of electronic surveillance.14 As Justice White explained,
third parties can be excluded from confidential meetings, or de-
fense strategy need not be revealed when third parties are
present. 148
These assertions rest upon questionable assumptions about
human behavior. Moreover, they fail to conform to the situation
where a police officer or informant masquerades as a defendant in
a multiple party prosecution. Even if the defendants are repre-
sented by separate counsel, the need for coordinated defense strat-
egy requires communication among the various defendants and
their respective attorneys. 49 A fortiori, the Court's measures are
unworkable in instances of joint representation. Finally, the
Court's assurance that the prosecution is barred from using privi-
leged information at trial will not appreciably reduce the chilling
effect, since the possibilities of prejudice take subtle and varied
forms;150 defense lawyers, if not their clients, well appreciate the
possibilities. In sum, the no-communication rule announced in
Weatherford is seriously inadequate to prevent surreptitious intru-
sion from influencing the outcome in particular cases and, more
generally, to maintain candid and full exchanges between defen-
dants and their lawyer.
B. Three Methods for Protecting the Accused from Adversary
Prejudice
At least three methods for coping with improper adversary
prejudice to the accused can be observed in the Court's right-to-
counsel decisions: (1) case-by-case analysis of particular circum-
stances; (2) per se rules; and (3) prophylactic rules. Under a case-
by-case approach, trial judges are charged with appraising the facts
in each case to determine whether preliminary action designed to
ensure fairness in the proceedings is necessary; appellate courts
normally decide whether the trial court's failure to act adversely
affected the accused. Under a per se rule, potentially prejudicial
conduct is absolutely prohibited; failure to comply with the rule
147. 429 U.S. at 554-55 n.4.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 564 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 135-42.
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typically calls for reversal on appeal without inquiry into whether
the particular defendant suffered prejudice. A prophylactic rule
represents a broad curative measure designed to prevent, detect
and neutralize prejudice to the accused; it often combines case-by-
case analysis with per se mandates. This third category of rules
maintains a unique constitutional status. Prophylactic rules are ju-
dicially created and designed to safeguard interests protected by
the Constitution, but they neither delineate those interests nor
prescribe indispensable means for their protection. The postarrest
warnings set forth in Miranda v. Arizona'51 are an example. The
Miranda Court expressly acknowledged that the decision's man-
date is subject to legislative modification, provided that alternative
mechanisms are employed to alleviate the inherent compulsion of
custodial interrogation. 152
By establishing that appointment of counsel to represent indi-
gent defendants in state felony prosecutions was not an invariable
requirement of fourteenth amendment due process, Betts v.
Brady' 5 illustrates certain strengths and weaknesses of the case-
by-case approach. Betts demanded appointed counsel only where
the circumstances of a particular case indicated that without coun-
sel the trial would be devoid of "fundamental fairness."" 4 Conse-
quently, the trial judge prior to trial would consider such factors as
the gravity of the offense, 55 the personal characteristics of the ac-
cused,5 e his familiarity with criminal proceedings, and the com-
plexity of the case'58 in order to decide whether counsel was neces-
sary. The fundamental fairness standard proved elusive and
difficult to apply for even the most conscientious trial judges; the
challenge of evaluating before trial the complexity of the prosecu-
tion's case, defenses thereto, and level of legal sophistication
151. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
152. Id. at 467. See generally Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword:
Constitutional Common Law, 89 H~Av. L. REv. 1 (1975).
153. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
154. It was thought that flexibility was necessary to preserve the integrity of local court
procedures. See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 658-60 (1942).
155. See, e.g., Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955) (capital offense).
156. See, e.g., DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947) (per curiam) (seventeen-
year-old defendant).
157. See, e.g., Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 683 (1948) (defendant unfamiliar with court
procedures).




needed for a defendant to represent himself pro se was too often
overwhelming. 15 9 Further, such an elusive standard provided an
opportunity for circumvention by state courts opposed to the Betts
rule. 16 The flexibility of Betts' case-by-case approach, intended to
preserve the integrity of local court procedures, engendered the
very federal-state friction that it was designed to avoid, as mani-
fested in the relative frequency with which federal habeas courts
ordered the release of state prisoners because of failure to appoint
counsel.16 1
When implementing a case-by-case balancing test, courts
sometimes place a thumb on the scales by weighing a particular-
ized interest of an individual against a larger, abstract interest of a
class. Almost invariably the balance comes out in favor of the lat-
ter.162 The analysis of the Court in Weatherford illustrates balanc-
ing skewed by such unequal characterization of the relevant inter-
ests. Having asserted as a general proposition that an absolute ban
on covert intrusion into the defense camp would harm society by
unnecessarily restricting an indispensable investigatory method,
the Court did not pause to consider whether the facts justified the
intrusion in the instant case. Instead, it accepted the assertion that
the agent's continued work in other undercover investigations was
critical, and that by declining the invitation to attend the defense
meetings he would have jeopardized his undercover status.6 3 In
contrast, the Court refused to speculate on prejudice to the ac-
159. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 781 (1949) (due process clause "not suscep-
tible of reduction to a mathematical formula"). It proved even more difficult for appellite
courts to apply a forward-looking standard with the result that the due process inquiry on
appeal shifted from a determination of whether the facts as they appeared at the inception
of the proceeding warranted appointment of counsel, to an after-the-fact determination of
whether the absence of counsel resulted in the accused "actually being taken advantage of,
or prejudiced." Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 739 (1948). See generally Green, The Bill
of Rights, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court, 46 MICH. L. REv. 869, 897-
99 (1948).
160. "In some states, the courts had twisted the rule to the point where the right to
appointed counsel was almost non-existent no matter what the nature of the case." See
Israel, supra note 53, at 264.
161. See Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Post-Conviction Remedy for State Prisoners,
108 U. PA. L. REV. 461, 465, 483-85 (1960).
162. See Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's
Balancing Test, 76 HARv. L. Rav. 755, 761-62 (1963).
163. The record does not support a conclusion that pretrial disclosure of Weatherford's
true identity would have either endangered his life or frustrated other on-going investiga-
tions. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 545, 566 n.5 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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cused absent actual proof in the record that evidence or defense
strategy was communicated to the prosecution.""
By requiring the appointment of counsel in all state felony tri-
als, Gideon v. Wainwrightl' 5 alleviated the institutional costs in-
volved in administering Betts.6 6 Additionally, such a per se rule
precludes comparisons between inherently unequal interests of the
type in Weatherford. The widespread acclaim for Gideon's per se
rule should not obscure, however, the costs of this approach: the
rule imposes financial burdens upon the states and federally dic-
tates local court procedures. Moreover, per se rules may spawn dis-
ingenuous decisions at a later time, because the logic of per se rules
often implicates more than courts are willing to impose. Subse-
quent decisions dealing with the right to appointed counsel are
illustrative. 16 7
Although the charge in Gideon was a felony, the Court's ra-
tionale for its per se rule was that "any person. . . who is too poor
to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him."6e Gideon thus was relied upon in Argersinger
v. Hamlin,16 9 which required appointed counsel in state court mis-
demeanor prosecutions if the defendant faced possible imprison-
ment. The Court observed the need for counsel to defend petty
offense prosecutions, such as vagrancy, which "often bristle with
thorny constitutional questions.' 170 The Court also invoked equal-
ity in referring to data showing that unrepresented misdemeanants
fare worse in plea negotiations than represented defendants. 71
164. Id. at 556-57.
165. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
166. Gideon did not end case-by-case, multi-factor analysis as the underpinning of the
right to counsel in noncriminal contexts, where the availability of counsel continues to be
governed by a Betts-type analysis. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prison
disciplinary proceeding); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation revocation
proceeding).
167. See infra notes 169-85 and accompanying text.
168. 372 U.S. at 344.
169. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
170. Id. at 33. See also Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (municipal
vagrancy ordinance which levied criminal penalties on "rogues and vagabonds," "persons
wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object;
habitual loafers; disorderly persons," and many other categories of persons, found void for
vagueness because it both failed to give notice and encouraged arbritary and erratic arrests
and convictions).
171. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 36.
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More recently, the Burger Court in Scott v. Illinois17 2 has
halted the logical application of Gideon by refusing to require ap-
pointed counsel in state misdemeanor prosecutions in which no jail
sentence is imposed. The advantages of Scott are obvious; states
are spared the expense of providing counsel in a large number of
cases. Furthermore, since the rule is categorical-no appointment
unless imprisonment is imposed-its application does not involve
the institutional costs entailed in a case-by-case determination of
the need for counsel to assure fundamental fairness.
The reasoning of Scott, however, is far from obvious. Specifi-
cally, the principle upon which Gideon and Argersinger were dis-
tinguished is unclear. The Court, per Justice Rehnquist, did not
link imprisonment with the complexity of the issues and conse-
quent need for counsel. Instead, he stated that "actual imprison-
ment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of
imprisonment, ' 173 thereby implying that Gideon's values, reliabil-
ity and equality were not controlling in Scott because of the insig-
nificance of the sanction. Similar reasoning supported the capital
offense exception to Betts v. Brady; counsel was constitutionally
required in all capital cases, without regard to issues of complexity
or the defendant's ability to defend. 17 4 However, Gideon categori-
cally rejected this type of balancing to determine the right to coun-
sel in criminal cases. 17 5 Its reappearance as the implicit intellectual
basis of the decision in Scott demonstrates that per se rules often
beget borders or limits that cannot be justified in terms of the un-
derpinnings of the rule.
United States v.Wade 7 6 and Gilbert v. California1 are illus-
trative of the third method of implementing constitutional protec-
tions-prophylactic rules. The Warren Court in these cases relied
upon the right-to-counsel guaranty as the textual basis for impos-
ing novel requirements designed to safeguard criminal defendants
from mistaken eyewitness identification at trial. Relying upon evi-
dence that improper suggestiveness in the conduct of lineups and
172. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
173. Id. at 373.
174. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
175. "The Court has come to recognize. . . that the mere existence of a criminal charge
constituted in itself special circumstances requiring the services of counsel at trial." 372 U.S.
at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring).
176. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
177. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
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other identification procedures created a significant possibility of
misidentification, the Court required the presence of defense coun-
sel at pretrial identification proceedings as a means of preventing
improper suggestiveness and of neutralizing its effect at trial.
The Court implemented the counsel requirement through two
subrules: failure to provide counsel at a lineup bars any courtroom
testimony about the out-of-court identification;17 8 in-court identifi-
cation of a defendant by a witness who previously viewed him at a
lineup without counsel is admissible, however, provided the
prosecution first establishes that the witness would not rely upon
recollection of the prior uncounseled identification in identifying
the accused in court. The prosecution must show an "independent
source" for the in-court identification. 179
These rules, particularly the per se exclusion of pretrial identi-
fication testimony, establish an incentive for the authorities to pro-
vide opportunities for counsel's presence at pretrial identifica-
tions.180 Greater compliance with the counsel mandate no doubt
would have been achieved by excluding all identification testimony
of witnesses who viewed the defendant at pretrial identification
proceedings where counsel was absent, but the Court rejected this
costly per se option because many lineups are conducted fairly
even though counsel is not present. 81 Still, some measure was
needed to offset the temptation to use an uncounseled, pretrial
identification confrontation to "crystallize the witnesses' identifica-
tion of the defendant for future reference,118 2 and then rely solely
on the witnesses' in-court identification. The independent source
rule was designed to maintain the effectiveness of the requirement
of counsel at pretrial identifications.18 3
Experience under Wade-Gilbert has revealed a weakness in
the independent source requirement. Courts almost always find
178. Id. at 272-73.
179. Id. at 241-42.
180. "Only a per se exclusionary rule as to such [out-of-court identification] testimony
can be an effective sanction to assure that law enforcement authorities will respect the ac-
cused's constitutional right to the presence of his counsel at the critical lineup." Id. at 273.
181. "[flIt may confidently be assumed that confrontations for identification can be and
often have been conducted in the absence of counsel with scrupulous fairness and without
prejudice to the accused at trial." Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 299 (1967) (holding Wade
nonretroactive).
182. Wade, 388 U.S. at 240.
183. Id. at 240-41.
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that the prosecution has satisfied its burden and thus permit in-
court identification despite a Wade violation.8 In those few in-
stances where the prosecution fails to prove an independent
source, the in-court identification likely would be excludable with-
out any assistance from Wade and Gilbert on the due process
ground that the identification lacks reliability. The factors perti-
nent to independent source and due process are strikingly simi-
lar.185 The only significant difference is whether the prosecution
must demonstrate the reliability of identification testimony or
whether the defense must demonstrate its unreliability. In both in-
stances, reliability is the crux of the inquiry.
The Wade-Gilbert rules are instructive. By qualifying per se
exclusion with the case-specific, independent-source determina-
tion, the Warren Court sought to avoid adversary prejudice gener-
ally without sacrificing accurate guilt determination in particular
cases. However, the weakness of this approach is that too lenient
an application of the moderating subrule may unacceptably dimin-
ish the overall effectiveness of the counsel requirement.
C. Proposed Prophylactic Measures Against Adversary
Prejudice from Surreptitious Intrusion into the Defense Camp
In Weatherford, the Court considered alternative rules for
dealing with the hazard of adversary prejudice from covert intru-
sion by law enforcement agents into the defense camp. The major-
ity rejected a per se rule forbidding the conduct and requiring re-
versal for violations; it instead adopted a case-by-case examination
for prejudice. Neither alternative is satisfactory; a per se prohibi-
tion would unduly hinder legitimate and necessary law enforce-
ment activity, while a case-by-case inquiry provides inadequate
safeguards against adversary prejudice.
The Wade-Gilbert matrix suggests a distinct approach consist-
ing of prophylactic rules designed to prevent and neutralize adver-
sary prejudice while accommodating legitimate law enforcement
184. See Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain
Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MICH. L. REv. 717, 722 (1974); Note,
Pretrial Identification Procedures-Wade to Gilbert to Stovall: Lower Courts Bobble the
Ball, 55 MINN. L. REV. 779, 818 (1971).
185. Compare United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967) (setting forth the crite-
ria governing the independent source inquiry) with Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200
(1972) (listing the factors governing the due process test).
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needs. Covert government intrusion into the defense camp, like
pretrial identification, may constitute legitimate law enforcement
conduct. In a given case, however, they also may seriously derogate
from the right to a fair trial, and that consequence may be unin-
tended and indeed unrecognized by the prosecution. Additionally,
in each instance defendants frequently cannot avoid the prejudice,
for they will not be aware of it.
Covert contact by law enforcement officials with members of
the defense threatens to disadvantage individual defendants in the
adversary process in several ways. The prosecution may acquire ev-
idence for use in the pending trial;18 the prosecution may learn
defense strategy;8 7 or the intrusion, if it becomes known or sus-
pected, may impair defense counsel's ability to obtain the client's
cooperation.18 8 There are at least three measures that would tend
to mitigate these adverse effects without frustrating legitimate law
enforcement efforts. These measures would also serve to lessen the
general chilling effect on attorney-client communications occa-
sioned by the threat of intrusion.
First, permissible surreptitious contact by government agents
with defendants and defense attorneys should be limited to con-
duct that is necessary to achieve a substantial law enforcement ob-
jective not reasonably attainable by other means. Second, where an
intrusion satisfies this standard, the intrusion should be limited in
extent and frequency to that necessary for essential law enforce-
ment objectives, and the agent should take all reasonable steps to
minimize the likelihood of overhearing privileged information."8 9
Finally, measures should be adopted to prevent communication of
privileged information to those engaged in the preparation and
presentation of the prosecution's case against the accused, such as
isolating the agent from the prosecution team.190
186. See, e.g., Sugar v. New Jersey, 84 N.J. 1, 417 A.2d 474 (1980).
187. See, e.g., United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1978).
188. See, e.g., Barber v. Municipal Court, 24 Cal. 3d 742, 598 P.2d 818, 157 Cal. Rptr.
658 (1979).
189. Confidential informants of the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the confines
of the Third Circuit are routinely instructed not to become involved in discussions of de-
fense strategy. See United States v. Natale, 494 F. Supp. 1114, 1117 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
190. See United States v. Meinster, 478 F. Supp. 1131, 1133 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (isolation
of informant from the trial team considered in rejecting sixth amendment claim based on
surreptitious intrusion into the defense camp). Cf. United States v. O'Neill, 484 F. Supp.
799 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (no sixth amendment violation found when government lawyers improp-
erly obtained a tape of a conversation between the defendant and an informer, since no
[Vol. 32
GOVERNMENT INTRUSION
Absent effective mechanisms for enforcement and monitoring,
these standards for police and prosecutorial conduct are meaning-
less. Requiring prior judicial approval of covert contact with the
defense upon a convincing showing that an alternative course of
action would endanger the safety of the agent or thwart a signifi-
cant law enforcement interest is a plausible enforcement measure.
Experience with the administration of the provisions of Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968191
teaches, though, that this type of prior review is largely pro forma.
Although that Act mandates prior judicial authorization of elec-
tronic surveillance upon a satisfactory showing that alternative in-
vestigative procedures are impracticable or unsafe, 92 judges are
unwilling to review seriously police representations about the feasi-
bility and necessity of taking investigatory action. 93
A post hoc judicial assessment of whether an intrusion was
justified under the suggested standards and of whether the under-
cover agent sought to minimize the invasion also is not likely to be
effective. As Weatherford demonstrates, courts do not deem them-
selves competent to review these kinds of investigatory, law en-
forcement determinations. Additionally, although Title III requires
that law enforcement personnel minimize the intrusiveness of au-
thorized electronic surveillance, courts have been unable to de-
velop meaningful standards to implement this mandate.'" Judicial
elaboration of a similar minimization standard proposed here
promises no greater success.
What these considerations reveal is that -law enforcement
agencies and prosecutors' offices, instead of courts, should have the
initial and primary responsibility for developing and enforcing
guidelines which minimize the incidence and invasiveness of intru-
sion. Their duties should additionally extend to designing proce-
dures for isolating undercover agents who have had contact with
an accused or his lawyer from individuals engaged in preparing
and presenting the case against the accused. Courts are not with-
out responsibility, however. Their role is to ensure that law en-
information gained thereby was communicated to the trial team).
191. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, P.L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976)).
192. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (1976).
193. See J. CARR, THE LAW OF ELEctROmc SuRveuLmcH § 4.05[4] (1977).
194. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
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forcement officials adopt and adhere to satisfactory safeguards.
This division of labor acknowledges that law enforcement and
prosecution officials are more competent than are judges to regu-
late investigatory activity, and are thus better able to protect citi-
zens from its abuses.
The following proposal illustrates the envisioned interplay of
courts and law enforcement officials. It would be appropriate to
require the prosecution to disclose to the court in camera whether
an undercover agent or informant has had contact with the ac-
cused or his attorney during the pendency of the prosecution. Fail-
ure to disclose should be sufficient for reversal of a conviction
without proof of actual prejudice. It also should be grounds for dis-
ciplinary action against those responsible.
Upon disclosure of surreptitious contact, the prosecution
should be required to verify: (1) that neither the prosecuting attor-
neys nor their assistants have acquired knowledge pertinent to the
case or information about defense strategy as a result of the con-
tact with the defense; and (2) that adequate guidelines to minimize
the incidence and scope of intrusion and to avoid communication
of privileged information have been followed in the instant case. If
the prosecution cannot verify the first statement, the charges
should be dismissed. If the first but not the second is verified, the
prosecution should either drop the pending prosecution or make
full revelation to the defense of all surreptitious contact. Under the
latter course, the prosecution must demonstrate before trial that it
acquired no evidence or information about defense strategy as a
result of the contact. Finally, upon a satisfactory verification of
both statements, the prosecution need not disclose surreptitious
contacts to the defense if the court determines in camera that dis-
closure would endanger an undercover agent or informant or jeop-
ardize an ongoing investigation. Weatherford's minimal mandate
of reversal if a defendant establishes that privileged information
acquired through covert contact was communicated to the prosecu-
tion would remain effective.
The above rules are inspired by the procedures governing pre-
trial identification. Weatherford's no-communication rule and the
due process standard employed in identification cases are similar;
each mandates reversal if the accused establishes a realistic possi-
bility of adversary prejudice based upon the totality of facts and
circumstances, without reliance upon other judge-made safeguards.
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Requiring the authorities to adopt and use the guidelines and pro-
cedures proposed here is akin to requiring counsel's presence at
pretrial identification proceedings. Each is a prophylactic measure
designed to prevent and neutralize adversary prejudice. Since fail-
ure to utilize these suggested safeguards does not itself establish
adversary prejudice, the proposal permits the prosecution to
demonstrate that there has been none, just as Wade-Gilbert per-
mits the prosecution to show an independent source for an in-court
identification following a prior identification without counsel. 195
Requiring the prosecution to prove the absence of taint, however,
is also designed to encourage utilization of the appropriate safe-
guards. Thus, the effectiveness of the proposed safeguards depends
upon courts rigorously enforcing the no-prejudice requirement and
thereby avoiding the deterrent weakness that has developed in im-
plementation of the analogous independent-source rule under
Wade-Gilbert.9 6
D. Prophylactic Constitutional Rules and the Burger Court
Accurate guilt determination by eschewing impediments to
convicting the guilty and by pursuing rules enhancing reliability is
an often heard justification for the Burger Court's decisions on
criminal procedure. 197 Decisions curtailing federal habeas corpus
review of fourth amendment claims,198 while liberalizing such re-
view of insufficient evidence claims, lend credence to this observa-
tion.19 9 In contrast, the pursuit of social objectives extrinsic to reli-
195. See supra text accompanying notes 176-83.
196. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
197. See Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86
YALE L.J. 1035, 1068-1102 (1977). See also Chase, The Burger Court, The Individual, and
the Criminal Process: Directions and Misdirections, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 518, 519 (1977). The
Court's own rhetoric supports this view. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112-13
(1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-92 & n.31 (1976); id. at 496 (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448-49 (1976); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.
97, 112-13 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 535-36 (1975); Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970).
198. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (where a state has provided an opportunity'
for full and fair litigation of a fourth amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted
federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that unconstitutionally obtained evidence was
introduced at trial).
199. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (rejecting the "no evidence" rule and




able outcomes, sometimes through the creation of truth-defeating,
prophylactic rules, is said to be the hallmark of the Warren
Court.2 0 The decision in Mapp v. Ohio,2 °1 which requires states to
exclude illegally seized evidence, provides plausible support for
this observation.
Because Mapp embodies a prophylactic constitutional rule
that denies the fact-finder in a criminal trial access to reliable and
probative evidence, it has been especially vulnerable to attack and
retrenchment in subsequent Supreme Court decisions. Stone v.
Powell202 barred habeas corpus review of fourth amendment claims
except where inadequate opportunity existed for adjudication in
the state court. The Burger Court's hostility toward prophylactic
constitutional rules, however, is not limited to those that deny pro-
bative evidence. Retrenchment extends to previous rules aimed at
enhancing reliability as well; the restrictive applications of Mi-
randa v. Arizona and Wade-Gilbert, both paradigms of Warren
Court prophylactic rules, are illustrative. According to the Burger
Court, pretrial statements obtained in defiance of Miranda may be
used to impeach an accused's testimony at trial.20 3 Wade-Gilbert's
erosion has been especially marked and warrants elaboration, par-
ticularly since it provides the inspiration for the proposals in this
Article.
The assault began with Kirby v. Illinois,20 4 which dispensed
with Wade's counsel requirement for lineups that occur before for-
mal initiation of criminal charges, typically arraignment, since the
sixth amendment right to legal representation for other purposes is
not triggered until arraignment. Earlier recognition of a prear-
raignment right to counsel at custodial interrogation in Escobedo
v. Illinois205 and Miranda was put aside as fifth amendment, self-
incrimination jurisprudence. Perhaps because such reasoning could
not be logically supported, the Court chose to ignore the fact that
lineups present hazards of mistake and suggestion, whether before
or after a formal charge. Reducing this threat to reliability was, of
course, the essence of Wade-Gilbert's counsel mandate.
200. See, e.g., Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 197, at 1092-93.
201. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
202. 428 U.S. at 465.
203. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
204. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
205. 378 U.S. at 478.
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Assault became a rout in United States v. Ash,206 which found
counsel unnecessary at a postindictment photographic array during
which a witness was presented with the defendant's photograph
among other photos. The majority opinion reasoned that unlike a
lineup, an accused is not present at a photographic identification
and his lawyer therefore need not be present either. Authority for
these assertions was found in decisions constitutionally mandating
counsel at pretrial proceedings at which the accused is confronted
with either legal complexities or prosecution officials. 207 The Court
discovered in this line of cases a principle that the pretrial right to
counsel attaches only at "trial-like confrontations" at which the ac-
cused is present.20  That photographic identifications can be as
suggestive and equally hazardous to reliability as corporeal identi-
fications was of minor importance in light of the no-defendant, no-
lawyer principle.0 9
It is obvious that the Burger Court is exceedingly dubious of
Wade-Gilbert. A refusal to extend rulings in the slightest, coupled
with a refusal to overrule, is the only plausible explanation for the
departures in Kirby and Ash from the rationale of Wade-Gilbert.
The Burger Court has not questioned, however, the constitutional
authority of the Court to promulgate prophylactic rules.210 Indeed,
the dissenting opinion in Holloway v. Arkansas211 described the
Court's interpretation of the right to counsel in that case as "pro-
206. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
207. Id. at 311. The Court cited Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. at 52 (sixth amend-
ment violated where accused is required to enter guilty plea without assitance of counsel);
White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (accused's sixth amendment rights violated when
forced to plead without presence of attorney); Massiah, 377 U.S. at 201 (statements ob-
tained by ruse in the absence of counsel violates accused's right to counsel); Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (preliminary hearing is "critical stage" requiring presence of
counsel); and Wade, 388 U.S. at 263 (denial of counsel at lineup violated accused's sixth
amendment rights). Id.
208. Ash, 413 U.S. at 312-13.
209. In contrast to the Court's analysis, Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, ad-
vanced a pragmatic distinction, contending that "[a] photographic identification is quite
different from a lineup, for there are substantially fewer possibilities of impermissible sug-
gestion when photographs are used, and those unfair influences can be readily reconstructed
at trial." Id. at 324. For a critical analysis of the Burger Court identification decisions, see
Grano, supra note 184.
210. For a critique of prophylactic constitutional rulemaking, see Schrock & Welsh, Re-
considering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1117 (1978).
211. 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
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phylactic gloss. '212 The trial judge in Holloway had summarily de-
nied a motion for appointment of separate counsel to represent
three indigent co-defendants made by the public defender, who
claimed that their interests were in conflict. The Court reversed
without inquiring into whether a conflict had developed at trial,
holding instead that the trial court should have either appointed
separate counsel or conducted an inquiry to determine whether the
risk of conflict was "too remote to warrant separate counsel.
'213
The decision may be fairly characterized as prophylactic, since it
rejected a per se prohibition against compulsory joint representa-
tion, 1 4 while reversing without any showing of actual conflict or
other prejudice.215
The subsequent decision in Cuyler v. Sullivan216 demonstrates
the limited scope of Holloway's safeguards. Absent special circum-
stances, a trial court has no duty to inquire on its own initiative
into the possibility of conflict from multiple representation.211 Fur-
thermore, to prevail on a conflict of interest claim raised for the
first time on appeal, a defendant "must demonstrate that an actual
conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." '
Apparently, this standard would also govern review where a trial
court, after an adequate inquiry, determined the possibility of con-
flict too remote to justify separate counsel. 1
Cuyler rejected a rule that would require reversal where joint
212. Id. at 493 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 484.
214. The Court wrote:
Requiring or permitting a single attorney to represent codefendants . . . is not
per se violative of constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel.
[I]n some cases. . . certain advantages might accrue from joint representa-
tion. In Mr. Justice Frankfurter's view: "Joint representation is a means of in-
suring against reciprocal recrimination. A common defense often gives strength
against a common attack."
Id. at 482-83 (quoting Glaser, 315 U.S. at 92).
215. Justice Powell, in dissent, analogized Holloway's requirement of judicial inquiry
into the possibility of prejudice to Miranda's mandate of warnings before interrogation. Id.
at 493 (Powell, J., dissenting).
216. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
217. Id. at 346-47.
218. Id. at 348. However, a defendant need not demonstrate that the conflict and re-
sulting impairment of defense counsel's performance affected the outcome of his case, and
such a sixth amendment violation is never harmless irror. Id. at 349-50.
219. See People v. Madison, 81 Ill. App. 3d 471, 401 N.E.2d 571 (1980) (applying actual
conflict standard on appeal where possibility of conflict between codefendants represented
by the public defender was brought to the court's attention prior to trial).
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representation created the mere possibility of conflict, however re-
mote; according to Justice Powell, the resulting high rate of rever-
sal would lead to a total ban on joint representation.220 This, he
contended, would be detrimental to defendants, since they would
be denied the benefits of this sometimes advantageous representa-
tional arrangement.221
That result, however, is not inevitable. The more liberal stan-
dard need not apply to a defendant who, because of some antici-
pated benefit, elects joint representation after being advised of the
risks entailed. Such a person raising a conflict claim could justly be
required to demonstrate actual conflict and impaired representa-
tion under the Cuyler standard.222 However, a defendant who has
not elected multiple representation, indeed, who has had it foisted
upon him, is entitled to application of the more liberal standard.
Since the effects of conflict frequently are not apparent on the face
of the record,223 it is grossly unfair to require the latter to demon-
strate that an actual conflict affected his attorney's performance.
Of course, the ensuing high rate of reversal probably would pre-
clude requiring indigent co-defendants to accept joint representa-
tion; consequently, poor defendants would enjoy the same right to
a lawyer's exclusive services now reserved for those with means to
retain counsel.224
The Burger Court evidently finds this result unacceptable be-
cause of the financial burden on the states in providing separate
counsel and the increased potential for delay and disruption in a
prosecution of multiple defendants with each additional defense
attorney. As with the rule of Scott v. Illinois,225 the Court's under-
lying concerns are conservation of state finances and efficiency in
criminal justice administration.226 Surely, it is no coincidence that
the prophylactic rule mandated in Holloway entails little or no
220. 446 U.S. at 348.
221. Id. See also supra note 214.
222. Cf. Tague, Multiple Representation and Conflict of Interest in Criminal Cases, 67
GEo. L.J. 1075, 1091 (1979).
223. As the Court acknowledged in Holloway, a conflict between jointly represented
defendants may preclude counsel on behalf of one of his clients "from exploring possible
plea negotiations and the possibility of an agreement to testify for the prosecution. .. 435
U.S. at 490. Such omissions seldom, if ever, will appear in the record.
224. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
225. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 172-75.
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cost to the states. Appointment of separate counsel is required
only where the trial court finds an unacceptable risk of conflict.
Any monetary or administrative cost from appointment of separate
counsel under this standard is probably offset by a reduction in
reversals and retrials because a defendant is able to show that an
actual conflict impaired representation. Furthermore, inquiry into
the possibility of conflict is not likely to cause significant delay,
especially since there is no duty to inquire without prompting, un-
less the court "knows or reasonably should know that a particular
conflict exists. '227 Finally, the difficulty of demonstrating on ap-
peal that conflict actually affected representation means that re-
versals under this standard will be few, as, for obvious reasons, will
be reversals necessitated by a trial court's failure to inquire into
the possibility of conflict.22 s
Accordingly, the basis for the hostile reception given Wade-
Gilbert by the Burger Court is more likely attributable to a desire
to avoid the delay and disruption of a lawyer's presence at pretrial
identifications 229 than to general doubt over the legitimacy of pro-
phylactic rules.230 Such hostility therefore does not doom the mea-
sures set forth here to ameliorate the hazards from surreptitious
intrusion of undercover agents. These hazards, of course, are dif-
ferent in kind and severity from those associated with identifica-
tion; the benefits and costs connected with the proposed measures
vary also from Wade's counsel mandate. Assessment of the hazards
of surreptitious intrusion and the effectiveness and cost of pro-
posed safeguards ultimately should determine the viability of par-
ticular prophylactic measures.
CONCLUSION
The right to counsel embraces two separate interests: reliable
and fair determinations in criminal proceedings, and treatment of
defendants with dignity and respect regardless of the effect on the
outcome of criminal proceedings. Experience has shown that gov-
227. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347.
228. But see Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981) (duty imposed on trial court to
inquire further, where hearing was possibly tainted by conflict of interest in that retail
clerks convicted of selling obscene materials were represented by counsel retained by their
employer).
229. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 218, 255-56 (White, J., dissenting).
230. See generally Schrock & Welsh, supra note 210.
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ernment contact with the defense threatens both interests; open
interference with the attorney-client relationship poses a threat to
dignity, and surreptitious intrusion creates hazards of subtle and
often undetectable adversary prejudice.
Safeguarding these interests requires that courts carefully
evaluate the risks and benefits from intrusion into the attorney-
client relationship in order to formulate appropriate remedies. De-
liberate interference with that relationship for no legitimate pur-
pose calls for damages against those responsible. Additionally, the
Court's approval of surreptitious intrusion when motivated by a
legitimate purpose necessitates adoption of measures which mini-
mize the possibility of adversary prejudice while accommodating
law enforcement needs.
The formulation of such measures is a demanding and delicate
task, one for which Burger Court jurisprudence, notwithstanding
its self-proclaimed penchant for reliability and fairness, is inade-
quate. Warren Court jurisprudence, on the other hand, is too com-
plex to be captured by facile generalizations about the pursuit of
social objectives independent of reliable process. Nonetheless, deci-
sions of the earlier Court provide a useful starting point for devis-
ing methods to cope with surreptitious intrusion into the attorney-
client relationship.
The formulation of such measures is a demanding and delicate
task, one for which Burger Court jurisprudence, notwithstanding
its self-proclaimed penchant for reliability and fairness, is inade-
quate. Warren Court jurisprudence, on the other hand, is too com-
plex to be captured by facile generalizations about the pursuit of
social objectives independent of reliable process. Nontheless, deci-
sion of the earlier Court provide a useful starting point for devising
methods to cope with surreptitious intrusion into the attorney-cli-
ent relationship.
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